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 Abstract 
Since his election into office, a cloud of uncertainty has surrounded President 
Trump’s foreign policy ambitions. Much of today’s scholarship concerns its 
unpredictable nature and scope. President Trump, like previous presidents have come 
before him, entered office with very little foreign policy experience. A key feature of his 
non-principled, fast-alternating foreign policy is that few people know exactly what he is 
going to propose next in terms of his international strategy. Coupled with this strategy is 
Trump’s desire for international credibility and a strong reputation. This desire seems 
fundamentally at odds with his foreign policy strategy, as Trump proposes isolationist 
measures and countries learn to fear his foreign policy’s unpredictability. 
This paper aims to take a critical look at the role of humanitarian intervention in a 
country’s foreign policy. It analyses whether countries like the United States can 
successfully introduce humanitarian intervention as a successful foreign policy 
prescription. More specifically, it aims to answer the following  research question: is it 
possible for the United States to reclaim its founding values through intervention in 
humanitarian crises without hindering the country’s military credibility? 
This paper first proposes theory, then aims to cement that theory in a real-world 
scenario through the analysis of a specific case study. It uses a combination of primary 
sources, secondary sources, and more qualitative methods of data gathering to deeply 
analyze the relationship between humanitarian intervention, military credibility, and the 
United States’ founding values. It then goes on to critically analyze the application of 
these findings to the genocide currently occurring in West Sudan. 
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 Arntson 1 
“Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, then that good men should look on 
and do nothing” - John Stuart Mill, 1867 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine whether it not there is room for 
humanitarian intervention in the President Trump’s foreign policy ambitions. More 
specifically, it’s aim is to assess whether it’s possible for the United States to sustain its 
founding values through intervention in humanitarian crisis without hindering the 
country’s military credibility. 
 America was founded on a strong set of moral principles and values, many of 
which become easily apparent after even a cursory glance at the country’s Declaration of 
Independence and Constitution. The Founders aimed to depart in almost every way from 
British rule. Modern scholarship on the topic of the American founding generally agrees 
that this means that the country’s founding was largely based on liberalist ideology.1 For 
example, they bore the consequences of struggles of power between the English monarch 
and Parliament, and created a system of separated powers and representative government 
in response to these experiences. This meant creating a government with strong 
democratic values, values that included the right to life, justice, liberty, and social 
equality. 
With these values in mind, the United States’ systemic non-intervention to 
prevent or stop acts of international genocide seems largely inconsistent with the 
country’s greater concepts of democracy and civilization. A look into the history of U.S.’ 
foreign policy with respect to general humanitarian intervention shows that time and time 
                                                
1 Fisher, L., 32. 
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again, state sovereignty and U.S. ambition rise above larger values of democracy and 
equality of being. What makes U.S. non-intervention especially disturbing is the fact that 
genocides, unlike wars, are perpetrated against a group because of who they are, not what 
they have done.2 Genocide is not a response by one party to an act of  violence by 
another. Instead, victims of genocide are targeted because of characteristics they are born 
with and oftentimes cannot change, such as ethnicity or religious view. Given these facts, 
isn’t it of even greater importance for the United States to be at the forefront of the 
international response to such atrocities? Instead of extending the country’s founding 
values to the international community, the U.S. routinely promotes treaties of profit and 
pleasure over those of higher moral significance. 
Since his election into office, President Trump has consistently pushed for 
military might over more humanitarian approaches in his foreign policy. In addition, he 
has proven to be inconsistent in his decision making, and eager to move on from current 
issues.3 It’s well known that humanitarian intervention costs money and resources. It 
requires a sympathetic response to the suffering of others, even if that intervention, on its 
face, does not seem to further domestic goals. The nature of humanitarian intervention, 
therefore, seems completely at odds with Trump’s proclaimed foreign policy, one that 
aims to narrowly further U.S. national interests, even at the expense of human rights, 
third world development, and humanitarian relief.4 This paper hopes to dispel the myth 
that humanitarian intervention must be pursued at the expense of national interests and 
                                                
2 Power, 58. 
3 Cooper, 2017. 
4 Ibid. 
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aims to discover that, in fact, intervention in humanitarian crisis can actually help bolster 
a country’s domestic economic, social, and political goals. 
This paper will begin by looking at the United States’ history with intervention in 
humanitarian crisis, focusing specifically on genocide. This analysis will be used as a 
backdrop for a theoretical exploration into whether humanitarian intervention can help 
the United States better connect with its founding values. In tandem, this paper will look 
at whether intervention in genocide can be achieved without hurting the United States’ 
international military credibility and if this type of intervention, under certain 
circumstances, can actually aid the United States in bolstering its international reputation. 
The final section of this paper will be dedicated to applying the theory explored in the 
first half to a relevant case study. The current genocide in Western Sudan will be 
analyzed, and the framework of intervention established in earlier sections will be 
applied. A case study will be used in the hopes of cementing the theoretical discoveries 
made earlier to the real world. These conclusions will hopefully act as a catalyst for 
future foreign policy considerations on this topic of humanitarian intervention – policies 
that will better suit important legal, ethical, and moral concerns. 
Research Methodology 
 In crafting, acquiring, and compiling all the necessary parts of this paper, a 
combination of primary and secondary sources was used in an attempt to acquire the most 
comprehensive view of the complex relationship between American founding values, 
humanitarian intervention in genocide, and the U.S.’ military credibility For one, original 
interviews by former and current politicians were used in order to understand the 
geopolitical constraints on political decision-making. To expand the breadth of primary 
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sources that were used, original studies from the Department of Defense and other 
governmental organizations were utilized to gain a better sense of contemporary 
challenges and possibilities regarding the United States’ international reputation and 
credibility. 
 In addition to primary sources, a wide variety of secondary sources were utilized. 
These included opinion pieces released by NGOs, scholars, and experts, and various 
studies on the ability of the United States to use humanitarian intervention to bolster the 
country’s reputation. In addition, persuasive essays on these topics were analyzed. 
Secondary data was collected using JSTOR and other wide-ranging databases. In 
addition, various reports and journal articles were pulled directly from organizations’ 
websites.  
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Chapter I: The United States’ History with Humanitarian Intervention 
 This section will critically evaluate the United States’ relationship with 
humanitarian intervention in genocide in an attempt to identify key geopolitical 
considerations that are taken into account throughout the decision-making process. This 
analysis will be bound to a short case study in order to deepen the level of study. 
The Rise of “Genocide” in American Politics 
 Even a cursory glance at the United States’ history with humanitarian intervention 
paints a bleak picture. Many scholars and advocates for such intervention argue in earnest 
that the United States has been consistently slow to act in the face of genocidal situations. 
In her enlightening novel “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, 
Samantha Power reveals that the United States has never in its history intervened to stop 
genocide and has in fact rarely made a point of condemning it as it occurred.5  
Efforts to bring acts of genocide into politicians’ purview did not substantially 
occur until the 1920’s. After hearing about the assassination of Talaat Pasha, one of the 
main perpetrators of the Armenian genocide, a Polish Jew by the name of Raphael 
Lemkin became interested in why Talaat, among others, had not been held responsible 
for his blatant violations of law and crimes against humanity.6 Specifically, Lemkin 
became intrigued why Talaat had not been arrested for his crimes in the first place and 
why there were no international laws covering such atrocities. Lemkin began lobbying 
members of Congress in the late 1930’s, following Hitler’s invasion of Poland. His 
attempts to spur action against crimes of atrocity largely fell flat. In response, Lemkin 
brought his message to the general public in the hopes that citizens would pressure their 
                                                
5 Power, Preface xv. 
6 Ibid., 19. 
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political representatives into action. Again, his cries fell on deaf ears. Both government 
officials in the Allied countries and journalists played down the intelligence of those 
reporting from Germany, arguing that the information was unsubstantiated and 
untrustworthy.7 This response was largely motivated by the simple fact that government 
officials and the larger public were unable to conceptualize the levels of heinousness 
being reported. This reaction is woven deeply into the fabric of the United States’ 
relationship with international crimes of atrocity. 
Around this time, Lemkin also began searching for a word that could be used to 
describe and stand for the atrocities in Nazi Germany and Turkey. He settled on 
genocide: geno was the Greek derivative for “race” or “tribe” and cide, the Latin 
derivative for “killing”.8 Lemkin hoped that by specifying certain crimes under this term, 
it would be easier for politicians and the larger citizenry to conceptualize and support the 
fight against those acts. Lemkin’s next advancement in his fight for the recognition of 
genocide was to draft a United Nations (UN) treaty banning genocide. He wanted the UN 
to establish a law that, if passed, would signal a new international reality in which states 
would no longer be able to use sovereignty to avoid taking responsibility for their 
actions.9 On December 11th, 1948, the General Assembly passed a law banning 
genocide. 
What ensued, including the United States’ refusal to ratify the convention, sheds a 
bright light on the country’s seeming inability to place higher moral principles over 
domestic interests. Although the convention had received U.S. support at the UN, many 
                                                
7 Ibid., 28. 
8 Ibid., 42. 
9 Ibid., 53. 
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policymakers feared that the ambiguous language of the treaty could be used to target the 
United States in future military action. As Power writes, “The core of American 
objections to the treaty had little to do with the text… rather American opposition was 
rooted in a traditional hostility towards any infringement on U.S. sovereignty, which was 
only amplified by the red scare of the 1950’s”.10 
The history of the Genocide Convention in itself highlights the complexity of the 
negotiation and adoption of such treaties. Perhaps even more importantly, it shows just 
how painstakingly the United States protects its sovereignty and personal interests above 
all. After the Convention was adopted by the UN, it took the United States nearly 40 
years to ratify it. Some politicians were concerned, especially during the Korean War and 
the Vietnam War, that U.S. officials might come under frivolous accusations of genocide. 
Similarly, some felt as though the ratification might result in charges of genocide due to 
the country’s history of segregation, lynching, and Ku Klux Klan activities.11 Others 
worried that if the United States ratified the convention, the country would be obligated 
to send military forces to distant countries in order to enforce it. 
Since the U.S. has ratified the Genocide Convention, the country has made very 
modest progress in its responses to genocide. Though the geopolitical constraints 
influencing U.S. decision-making have shifted with time, the U.S. has consistently 
refused to take risks in order to suppress acts of genocide.12 The very people who can 
push the policy agenda on intervention have been consistently muted and self-censored.13 
Though the geopolitical factors at play are complex and the decision-making process 
                                                
10 Ibid., 69. 
11 Ibid., 72. 
12 Ibid., 503. 
13 Glasser, 2004. 
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intricate, the United States’ desire to remain uninvolved can be boiled down into a simple 
thought process: attempting to spur the United States into action requires personal risk. 
Up until now, politicians have argued that there is little geopolitically to be gained by 
getting involved in international genocide. They also argue that only risks and costs are 
inevitable. The idea remains that there are no risks when the U.S. decides to stay largely 
uninvolved.14 
This phenomenon can be clearly seen during the Rwandan genocide. Intelligence 
reports obtained using the U.S. Freedom of Information Act show the cabinet, and almost 
certainly President Clinton, had been told of a planned “final solution to eliminate all 
Tutsis” before the slaughter reached its peak.15 They reveal that the U.S. government 
knew enough about the genocide early on to save lives, yet passed up countless 
opportunities to do exactly that. These documents undermine claims by Clinton and his 
senior officials that they did not fully appreciate the scale and speed of the killings. In 
addition, the administration avoided using the word “genocide”, as they feared the word 
would generate public opinion which would demand American action.16 In reality the 
administration simply felt that the U.S. had no interests in Rwanda, a small central 
African country with no minerals or obvious strategic value.  
U.S. Nonintervention in Cambodia: A Short Case Study 
In order to more deeply understand the United States’ complicated relationship 
with humanitarian intervention, it is important to assess the geopolitical factors 
influencing the country’s actions. The United States’ actions during the Cambodian 
                                                
14 Haydar, 2017. 
15 Carroll, 2004. 
16 Ibid. 
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genocide highlight deep-rooted tensions surrounding the United States’ understanding of 
how humanitarian intervention fits into the nation’s larger foreign policy scheme. From 
April 1975 to January 1979, the Communist Khmer Rouge (KR) killed nearly two million 
Cambodian people under their rule. Their goal was to transform Cambodia into a 
classless agrarian utopia.17 In reality, the group committed mass murder and other 
widespread atrocities; The KR systematically emptied entire cities and evacuated millions 
of people to labor camps. Within these camps, disease, exhaustion, and starvation were 
extremely prevalent. The vast majority of laborers were abused and eventually starved to 
death. It’s generally estimated that between 1.7 and 2 million Cambodians died during 
the 4-year reign of the KR.18  
There was little to no protest from the international community, including the 
United States. Neither the U.S. nor Europe called attention to the acts of atrocity as they 
escalated. The U.S. government was largely silent on the topic, and Congress failed to 
pass any piece of substantial legislation that could have paved the way for military action 
or humanitarian aid. 
Power points to a handful of factors that help explain the United States’ non-
involvement in international genocidal acts, including the Cambodian genocide. Among 
the important factors, she cites America’s inability to conceptualize widespread terror in 
the face of possible genocide.19 In the Cambodian genocide, policymakers and much of 
the public assumed that violence on the levels described by refugees and survivors could 
not occur. Policymakers, in particular, trusted the reassurances of the very government 
                                                
17 “The Cambodian Genocide”, 2016. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Power, Preface xvii. 
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committing acts of atrocity. Diplomats, journalists, and Cambodians, and Americans 
largely dismissed omens of imminent mass violence by the KR.20 Despite signs pointing 
otherwise, many believed that once the KR won the war against the Lon Nol government, 
they would have no need to initiate further acts of terror and killing.21 As Power points 
out, “In advance of the KR seizure of Phnom Penh, prolific early warnings of the 
organization’s brutality were matched by boundless wishful thinking on the part of 
American observers and Cambodian citizens. ”22 Without strong leadership, the system 
was inclined towards risk-averse policy choices. 
In addition, American political leaders interpret society-wide silence on the issue 
as an indicator of general indifference towards these events. They use this “indifference” 
to justify abstention from troop deployment in areas of conflict.23 Even when the facts 
emerged regarding the KR’s brutality in Cambodia, U.S. politicians responded with 
general disinterest and non-engagement.  There was not a single interest group or 
organization who was able to convince U.S. decision-makers that the millions of 
Cambodian deaths mattered enough to American interests to warrant attention. Strikingly, 
the U.S. policy of silence in the face of widespread humanitarian suffering was not 
seriously contested. Domestic political forces that might have pressed for action were 
absent, and most U.S. officials opposed to American involvement were firmly convinced 
that they were doing all they could - in light of competing American interests and a 
highly restrained understanding of what was “possible” for the United States to do. 
                                                
20 Ibid., 95. 
21 Ibid., 102. 
22 Ibid., 90. 
23 Ibid., Preface xviii. 
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As with many other genocides, the Cambodian genocide highlights broader points 
about humanitarian intervention and U.S. foreign policy. Namely, that politicians and 
powerful change-makers do not see intervention in genocide to be compatible enough 
with American interests to warrant action. Because America’s “vital national interests” 
were not considered imperiled by mere genocide, senior U.S. officials did not give the 
events in Cambodia the moral attention it warranted. It would have been politically 
unthinkable to intervene militarily and emotionally unpleasant to pay too close attention 
to the atrocities occurring there. The U.S. government realized instead, that it was 
domestically cost-free to look away. This is what so many people did, before, during, and 
after the Khmer Rouge’s reign of terror. In the United States, as with many other 
countries, foreign policy is viewed as a lifeless set of abstractions. Terms like “interests”, 
“influence”, and “prestige” are dehumanized terms which encourage easy inattention to 
the real people whose lives are affected by the country’s foreign policy decisions.24 In 
other words, policy analysis on whether the U.S. should intervene in Cambodia largely 
excluded discussion of human consequences. A foundational piece of this process is the 
mindset that policy is made by the “tough-minded”. To talk of suffering is to lose 
“effectiveness” and it is seen as a sign that one’s rational arguments are weak. 
As this paper will show, politicians must avoid seeing humanitarian intervention 
in genocide as a zero-sum gain. Largely, the current mindset stands as this: genocide is 
wrong, but the United States does not have a strong enough interest in preventing it to 
invest the military, financial, or political capital needed to stop it. History has shown that 
American policymakers have two main objectives. The first is to avoid engagement in 
                                                
24 Power, 2017. 
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conflicts that pose little threat to American interests, or carry no obvious geopolitical 
gains. The second is to contain the political costs and avoid the moral stigma associated 
with allowing genocide.25 This paper will show that humanitarian intervention in 
genocide, under certain conditions, and with certain stipulations, serves as a feasible way 
for the United States to both reclaim its founding values and increase its international 
reputation. Politicians and scholars should start seeing humanitarian intervention as a 
politically strategic avenue for the United States to pursue. 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 Power, 508. 
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Chapter II: Humanitarian Intervention and America’s Values Since the Founding 
 As was mentioned earlier, the United States’ refusal to intervene substantially in 
genocide remains completely at odds with the country’s founding values. For a country as 
influential and resource-rich as the United States to act in blatant disregard for its 
foundational principles remains shocking to many. Politicians and political leaders 
routinely tout democracy and other similar values in campaign speeches and Senate 
hearings. Yet, when it comes to international breaches of these values, they sit back and 
remain largely silent. This chapter provides an overview of America’s key founding 
values and critically analyzes humanitarian intervention as a way for the United States to 
reclaim these values in a significant and meaningful way. As James Wilson, one of the 
six men to sign both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United 
States declared, “There is not in the whole science of politicks a more solid or a more 
important maxim than this - that of all governments, those are the best, which, by the 
natural effect of their constitutions, are frequently renewed or drawn back to their first 
principles”.26 In order to see how to best move forward, we must critically analyze the 
founding principles of the society which we speak of.  
The United States’ Founding Values 
 In order to boil down the founding into its main principles, it is necessary to 
identify and assess which factors most heavily influenced the sentiments and desires of 
the Founding Fathers; It requires an appreciation for historical precedents and 
constitutional principles. Among other factors, the Founders were heavily influenced by 
                                                
26 Kermit, 698. 
 Arntson 14 
the Enlightenment and its belief that individuals have the capacity to develop and 
participate in self-government.27 It was during this period of time when many thinkers 
turned to reason and science to explain both the physical universe and human behavior. 
In America, it was decided that instead of being “subjects” ruled by a monarch, people 
should be citizens of a republic that upheld the ideals of democracy and representative 
government. The Founders believed that in return for general protection and order, the 
People would give up a small portion of their independence to their political 
representatives.28 In tandem with this thinking was the idea that the purpose of the U.S. 
Constitution was to protect the dignity and worth of individuals, enabling them to 
promote their skills and talents. The Constitution’s principal framer, James Madison, 
believed that an individual “has property in his opinions and in the free communication of 
them”.29 This property stake extended not just to material items, but to religious opinions 
and, most importantly, personal safety. Generally, the belief was as follows: it was the 
main responsibility of the government to promote the protection of its citizens’ property 
in all its forms. In return, those citizens would give their power and trust to the 
Constitution, in effect upholding the republic and the flag.30 The Founders strongly 
valued liberty as both an end and as a means. 
 In addition to the protection of individual liberty, the Founders also saw the 
pursuit of life and general happiness as a foundational principle of the new republic. The 
opening lines of the Declaration of Independence point to this fact. The Founders 
                                                
27 Fisher, 29. 
28 Ibid., 34. 
29 “The Papers”, 1977. 
30 Fisher, 29. 
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believed that an individual’s right to life should be considered sacred except in highly 
restricted and extreme circumstances, such as the use of deadly force to protect one’s 
own home or the lives of others. They drew on the current thinking of the time and used 
ideas of natural rights, such as the right to life, to justify their separation from England.31 
Many modern scholars believe that Thomas Jefferson, in his drafting of the Declaration 
of Independence, drew heavily from the writings of English Philosopher John Locke. 
Locke, who authored his Second Treatise of Government in 1689, wrote that all 
individuals are equal in the sense that they are born with certain “inalienable” natural 
rights, among which he believed to be life, liberty, and property. Locke believed that the 
most basic human law of nature is the preservation of mankind.32 To serve that purpose, 
he reasoned, individuals have both a right and a duty to preserve their own lives. These 
foundational principles motivated the Founders’ proof that revolution was necessary in 
order to end England’s tyranny over the colonists.33 Additionally, it is important to note 
that, as with other rights, the Founders saw the right to life as “self-evident”.34 In other 
words, the right to life is a self-evident truth that is not based on the speculations and 
shifting opinions of men. 
In addition to the foundational principles of the pursuit of life, liberty, and 
happiness, the Founders considered justice and social equality to be values of equal 
importance. In other words, the Founders believed that people should be treated fairly in 
the distribution of benefits and burdens of society, the correction of wrongs and injuries, 
                                                
31 Costly, 2001. 
32 Locke, 12. 
33 Hancock, 1775. 
34 “The Constitution of the United States,” Article 1, Section 1.  
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and the gathering of information and making of decisions. The creation of a 
representative government was necessary in order to achieve these goals. As John Adams 
argued, “Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders 
itself.”35 What resulted was a system of government where, among other things, the 
various branches of government balanced and checked each other’s constitutionally 
enumerated powers. The American republic solved the republican problem of corruption 
and degeneration over time by providing a power of constitutional amendment and 
allowing constant adaptation through a periodic return to founding principles. The U.S. 
Constitution is written in such a way as to vest in each branch core powers, powers which 
are to be exercised exclusively by that branch. At the same time, the Constitution also 
puts a check on the tendencies of any one branch toward self-aggrandizement by giving 
each branch a “partial agency” in the affairs of the others.36 Protecting from the “tyranny 
of the majority” meant framing the government in a way that allowed it to control the 
governed, and in the next step oblige it to control itself. The Founders worked to allow 
divergent, uncomfortable, or unpopular voices to be heard in politics, instead of allowing 
the opinion of the majority, however informed, to always rule. 
In addition, they believed that the values discussed above must be protected by 
natural law. Generally, the Founders believed that all men and women had certain 
unalienable rights, but that they must be understood within the limits of moral and civil 
law.37 It was accepted that a stern, self-renouncing virtue was essential in a democratic 
                                                
35 Williams, 2009. 
36 Clement, 3. 
37 Hall, 2009. 
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republic.38 Democratic citizens would need to learn to love the laws, love their country, 
and largely prefer public goods above their own private ones. Since loving the democracy 
meant loving equality, citizens would have to abstain from actions that would destroy 
equality and limit their desires for securing necessities.39 As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote 
in the introductory chapter of Democracy in America, “... nothing struck me more 
forcibly than the general equality of conditions… it creates opinions, engenders 
sentiments, suggests the ordinary in life, and modifies whatever it does not produce”.40  
Through their promotion of a representative government and liberty, the Founders 
managed to promote a more general notion of diversity. Diversity, for the Founders, was 
inclusive. They saw it broadly as variety in culture and ethnic background, race, and 
lifestyle. The belief was that diversity was not only permissible but desirable and 
beneficial in a pluralist society.41 James Madison argued that the freedoms the 
Constitution guaranteed depended on this pluralism: “This freedom arises from that 
multiplicity of sects which pervades America,” he said at the Virginia ratifying 
convention, “for where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority of any 
one sect to oppress and persecute the rest.”42 He repeated this point in Federalist Paper 
No. 10, where he argued that factions would not easily be able to attain their ends under 
the Constitution as long as there remained a diversity of interests in the large republic. 
                                                
38 Kane, 36. 
39 Ibid., 37. 
40 Mansfield, 34. 
41 Bier, 2012. 
42 Ibid. 
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In tandem with these ideals came a toleration of difference. It developed in 
parallel with the early liberalism prevalent among American thinkers’ European 
Enlightenment forbearers.43 It reflected a larger belief that hatred or fear of other races 
and creeds interfered with economic trade, extinguished freedom of thought and 
expression, eroded the basis for friendship among nations, and led to persecution and 
war. As mentioned earlier, America’s Founders were largely inspired by philosophical 
thinkers like John Locke. In his work A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke argues that 
government is generally ill-equipped to judge the rightness or wrongness of opposing 
opinions on topics spanning religious doctrines and societal views.44 Generally, the 
Founders strongly agreed that only through the promotion of diversity of thought, 
experience, and desire would America grow to become a powerful nation. 
Contemporary Shifts 
The preceding paragraphs have outlined a series of foundational values that the 
Framers embraced while creating the United States’ government and society. Among 
them are the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness. In addition, the Framers supported the 
ideals of justice, social equality, and diversity. These values are incredibly important, as 
they help us understand the qualities and values that helped forge our powerful country. 
In addition to identifying and appreciating them, it is important to take time to look at 
how these values have translated into contemporary times. Has the United States been 
able to uphold these values in the 21st century? As Joe Biden argues, “America’s ability 
                                                
43 Ralston, 2012. 
44 Locke, 1948. 
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to lead the world depends not just on the example of our power, but on the power of our 
example.”45 
Scholars largely agree that America’s values are in upheaval. This is triggered in 
large part by advances in technology, prolonged pessimism, and a loss of confidence in 
major social, political, economic, and religious institutions.46 In a study conducted in 
2012 by Penn Schoen Berland between May 25 and June 6, more than two-thirds of those 
surveyed believed that American values had declined. They pointed to political 
corruption, increased materialism, and declining family values as large catalysts in this 
assessment.47 Of those surveyed, half expect American values to continue to weaken over 
the next decade. 
These sentiments are alarming, as many would argue that our country, including 
its politicians, should be constantly working to reclaim our founding values and flush 
them throughout every political decision made. American values are not so abstract that 
they should shift and shape according to whoever claims them. Contrary to popular 
belief, American values are not regional - they should be held with reverence and seen as 
unifying forces that propel the country forward.48 
While the country is far from perfect, it should never give up the struggle to grow 
closer to the ideals embedded in its founding documents. History has shown that other 
nations tend to follow the United States’ lead because they know that America does not 
simply protect its own interests, but makes attempts to advance the aspirations of all. 
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Placing American democratic values back at the center of our foreign policy does not 
mean that the country should simply impose its principles abroad or refuse to talk with 
nations whose policies run counter to them. American values are the ones that tie to our 
closest allies. The ability of America to reconnect and reclaim its values through foreign 
policy will help assure U.S. allies that the United States will continue to support them and 
to stand up for democracy. 
Leading with the values outlined above means that we speak out when nations 
violate their citizens’ rights. It is widely believed that the country can meet its security 
imperatives without giving a green light to dictators who abuse universal human rights. A 
foreign policy built on American values must stand firm against foreign powers that 
celebrate a perceived withdrawal of American leadership as an opportunity to increase 
their influence. 
The Interplay of American Values and Genocide  
As the above discussion has shown, America was founded on a strong set of 
values that were deeply woven into the country’s founding documents by the Framers. 
Equally as important, there is strong evidence that the country has markedly shifted away 
from its founding values since the Framers first wrote the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution of the United States. In tandem with this shift comes the general 
sense that America’s founding values are not considered in foreign policy decisions and 
that the values so revered by individuals domestically are not supported and sustained 
abroad. The intentions and actions of those involved in genocidal acts go against 
America’s founding values in every imaginable way. 
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 In 1996, Gregory Stanton, the president of Genocide Watch, presented a briefing 
paper called The 8 Stages of Genocide at the United States Department of State.49 In it, he 
suggested that genocide develops in eight stages that are “predictable but not 
inexorable”.50 He also argued that though later stages must be preceded by earlier stages, 
all stages continue to operate throughout the process. The Stanton paper was presented at 
the State Department shortly after the Rwandan genocide and much of the analysis 
presented is based on why that genocide occurred. Stanton identified the following eight 
stages of genocide: “classification”, “symbolization”, dehumanization”, “organization”, 
polarization”, “preparation”, “extermination” and finally “denial”.51 These stages paint a 
very clear picture of what typically happens from start to finish during any particular 
genocide and at every stage, there are clear breaches of American founding values. 
During acts of genocide, people are divided into “us and them”. This already 
shows a breach of American values, as people are generally categorized by either their 
race, religious creed, or other defining characteristics in order to inflict harm on one 
specific group of people. What distinguishes genocide from war, and what makes it 
arguably more vile, is that victims of genocide are largely targeted for who they are, not 
specific actions they’ve taken. The “classification” of a certain subset of people in a 
society shows the beginning of this process. It allows the third stage, “dehumanization”, 
to occur, as one group denies the humanity of another group.52 This denial of humanity, 
or the state of being human, is in direct violation of all of the founding values identified 
                                                
49 Stanton, 1996. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
 Arntson 22 
earlier. Genocide involves systematically categorizing, separating, and exterminating a 
group of people because of who they are. Perhaps most obviously, it denies people the 
property stake in their own lives – a right that the Founders believed were imperative to a 
well-functioning society. As mentioned earlier, the Founders believed that this property 
stake extended not only to material items but to aspects such as religious opinions and 
personal safety. Acts of genocide specifically aim to eliminate the diversity of ideas, 
backgrounds, and beliefs that James Madison and others believed would create a robust 
marketplace of ideas. The Framers were concerned with creating an environment that 
promoted people’s individual skills and talent. In contrast, genocide rips away people’s 
dignity and violates their sense of self-worth. For genocide to occur, citizens must be 
stripped of their sense of self and boiled down to simple defining characteristics, 
characteristics that those perpetrating genocide see as undesirable. Victims’ contributions 
to society are either not considered or are seen as justification for complete elimination. 
Given the above characteristics, acts of genocide clearly violate the Founders’ desire for 
all people to have a strong sense of liberty, liberty that allows them to achieve both 
individual and communal happiness. 
In addition to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness, the Framers revered what 
justice, social equality, and diversity could provide in a society. As mentioned before, 
genocide aims to systematically eliminate diversity in society by eradicating a complete 
class of people based on a specific characteristic that identifies that group. The Founders 
believed that people should be treated fairly in the distribution of both benefits and 
burdens of society. Genocide unfairly penalizes one group in a society, with devastating 
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effects. It shifts the burden to this group because of characteristics, like race and 
ethnicity, that they oftentimes have no control over. While the Framers created a 
government that made explicitly sure to protect and promote divergent and minority 
opinions, genocide singles-out and extinguishes those who are considered undesirable by 
another group. Those promoting acts of genocide have absolutely no tolerance for 
difference. In fact, many believe that one of the concrete ways to prevent genocide is by 
creating universalistic institutions that transcend ethnic or racial differences.53 Overall, 
what the Founders hoped to establish was a society in which people were free and 
protected to live their lives as they saw fit. In exchange for giving up some of their 
liberties to the government, the Founders believed that the government could give back to 
the citizenry by protecting their individual interests and ideas. In contrast, genocide is, 
among other things, a form of social control - a response to behavior defined as deviant.54 
Grievances against a group are handled through systemic mass killings. Victims of 
genocide are typically harmed because they are categorized as an undesirable “other” 
class. What makes them unique in society, the uniqueness that the Founders aimed to 
foster, is used against them. 
Reclaiming our Values through Humanitarian Intervention in Genocide 
 So far, this paper has shown that since the founding, the United States has made 
marked shifts away from its founding values, especially with respect to the nation’s 
foreign policy. The question remains whether humanitarian intervention, in genocide 
specifically, can act as an effective way to reclaim those values in a substantial way. 
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Given the fact that acts of genocide violate most, if not every, American founding value, 
it seems somewhat obvious that American intervention in genocide presents a strong way 
for the country to reclaim its founding values. That being said, there are principle issues 
that must be addressed. 
One important dilemma is that of state sovereignty. The United Nations Charter 
specifically says: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state.55 Does this mean that countries like the United States are cautioned against 
intervention during threats to peace, such as genocide? The first operational principle of 
what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) calls 
the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) is as follows: “Where a population is suffering 
serious harm… and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt of avert it, the 
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”.56 In 
other words, R2P is an international law doctrine that permits collective humanitarian 
intervention to prevent or mitigate extreme human rights disasters, including genocide.57 
At the same time, sovereignty is a core feature of nation-statehood and the responsibility-
to-protect doctrine challenges sovereignty fundamentally. Many scholars have written on 
and discussed the relationship between state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. 
The general concern is whether recent international laws and covenants, such as the UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, are 
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incompatible with the traditional understanding of international society and the 
sovereignty of states. Some scholars argue that humanitarian intervention can be 
humanitarian at best only in part. In other words, each case must be evaluated 
individually because there are times when coercive intervention in a sovereign nation-
state is not justified by the conditions of oppression in that country.58 The irony lies in the 
fact that humanitarian intervention constitutes a breach of state sovereignty, yet the key to 
the effective observance of human rights remains national law and practice.  
As it turns out, the concepts of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention 
might not be as incompatible as they first seem. Generally, it’s believed that state 
sovereignty, when applied to international relations, is grounded in the will of 
international society and the citizens who make up that society.59 In other words, the 
principles outlined in the UN Charter do not rule out the application of enforcement 
measures in cases where human rights are clearly being violated. The Genocide 
Convention also overrode the non-intervention principle to allow for the commitment of 
the world community to prevent and punish.60 Many scholars believe that the respect for 
sovereignty that the international community holds is dependent on the capacity and will 
of the state to protect humanity. Abject failure to do so can lead to a fundamental 
forfeiture of the rights of sovereignty.61 humanitarian intervention, and the greater R2P 
principle, reinforces sovereignty by helping states to meet their existing responsibilities. 
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When it comes to the rights and fundamental freedoms belonging to individuals, states 
have simply assumed responsibility for them,  
 On the topic of the relationship between state sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention, the Founders sought to define a national good that transcended local 
interests and prejudices. Though they were deeply divided on how to properly conduct 
foreign policy, from a broader view, they looked to develop and spread a strong 
framework of foundational principles through the country’s foreign policy. The purpose 
was to demonstrate to the larger community of nations the feasibility of self-government 
and the application of justice as a sustainable ground for relations among people and 
nations.62 The Founders rejected modern approaches to American foreign policy 
represented by power politics, isolationism, and crusading internationalism. Instead, they 
design a truly American foreign policy - fundamentally shaped by the application of 
universal ideas, such as human equality, natural rights, and the rule of law. Overall, it 
seems as though there is a consensus from scholars and diplomats alike that humanitarian 
intervention is generally justified, as national sovereignty is outweighed by a more 
collective need to uphold basic human rights. 
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Chapter III: Constitutional Law - Trump’s Constitutionally Enumerated War 
Power 
Since the United States’ intervention in Kosovo, many international lawyers, 
scholars, and politicians have argued in favor of R2P. That being said, it is important to 
examine larger legal issues concerning humanitarian intervention, including the 
President’s Constitutional war power. 
War power and humanitarian intervention are inextricably tied and the use of 
military force to respond to a foreign humanitarian crisis raises profound legal questions, 
especially when force is not authorized by Congress or the U.N. Security Council. Ever 
since the founding of the country, the pace and scope of intervention have only grown in 
speed, lethality, and geopolitical importance. These trends have important and far-
reaching implications on the constitutional debate surrounding the powers of war and 
peace. Who exactly has constitutionally granted the power to commit and deploy troops 
internationally? This section will look at the history of the war power, with respect to 
both the executive and legislative branches. It will conclude with an analysis of the war 
power as it currently stands and the significance of this on the President’s ability to 
instigate intervention.  
The War Power and its Modern Interpretation 
The war power was almost immediately contested after the framing of the 
Constitution and, if anything, has only become more so as executive and legislative 
branches push and pull for respective powers in this arena. Surprisingly, the Founders 
remained intentionally vague about Congressional and Presidential war powers. Much of 
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the literature on the topic aims to argue that each branch brings unique advantages in 
times of crisis and war. These advantages, and the competing constitutional 
interpretations that accompany each, have been outlined and argued by many scholars. 
Within the debate over Congress and the executive’s powers of war, many commentators 
take either a narrow or an expansive view of the powers that Article I, Section 8 and 
Article II give to Congress and the executive branch respectively. The way the courts 
choose to interpret Article I and II is of the utmost importance, as it determines President 
Trump’s ability to send military force in areas affected by genocide.  
Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution outlines the President’s powers in this arena. It 
begins by stating that executive power is vested in a President of the United States. In 
addition, it makes the President the commander in chief and gives him power to make 
treaties granted the advice and consent of the Senate.63 This article in particular greatly 
divides those who take a narrow reading and those who take a more expansive reading of 
both the legislature’s and the executive’s war power. To the latter, Article 2’s “vesting” 
clause gives the President sweeping power to make decisions in times of war. More 
narrow interpreters do not deny the power of the vesting clause but instead argue that the 
remainder of Article 2 is simply a binding list of the specific powers vested in the 
executive – an exhaustive list of all of the enumerated powers the President has during 
times of conflict.64 Had the Founders wanted the executive to have a larger scope of 
power, they would have lengthened the list of acceptable actions like we find in Article I. 
Narrow interpreters go on to argue that Article II, in addition to being a short list, does 
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not include a “necessary and proper” clause that grants the President overarching powers 
to act as she deems fit in times of crisis. 
On the other hand, those who interpret the articles in a more expansive way have 
argued that the first sentence of Article 2 vests in the President all of the powers that fall 
under the general rubric of “executive power”.65 Being the sole representative for the 
United States’ foreign affairs, many scholars argue that this role gives him expansive 
powers over the United States’ actions in times of war and crisis. The nation must speak 
with one voice, not the voices of 50 individual states. To many, that power and duty are 
given and enumerated in the Constitution.  
Regardless of a specific interpretation of the relevant amendments, it is clear that 
both the legislative and executive branches are in key positions, and possess unique 
skills, to be able to manage and respond to war or a crisis. This is exactly what the 
Founders wanted and intended. The branches are not sealed off from each other in the 
decision-making process. Instead, they harbor shared powers. To be effective, many war 
and crisis-time decisions need to be made through the cooperation of more than one 
branch. At the same time, as Mariah Zeisberg argues in her novel War Powers: The 
Politics of Constitutional Authority, “if the branches did not have structural 
independence, “their colliding claims could be settled through enforced deference.”66 
The Legal Cases Behind Modern Interpretations 
It is this tension between reliance and independence that drive important debates 
and perspectives from each branch on the nature of war power. It also highlights the 
distinct advantages that each branch brings. For example, scholars argue that the 
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President, distinctive from Congress, has the unique ability to respond quickly to 
changing circumstances. The hierarchical nature of the branch and its unique resources 
allow the executive to respond much more efficiently and effectively in times of crisis. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer highlights this argument quite well. In 
1950, President Truman authorized the use of American troops in the conflict between 
North Korea and South Korea, calling it a “policing action” rather than an entrance into 
war.67 In the face of strikes by the United Steelworkers Union and a potential shortage of 
the steel necessary for the creation of ammunition, Truman issued an executive order to 
seize the steel mills and place them under government control. The day after, Truman 
reported the action he had taken and stated that he would follow any action taken by 
Congress. In response, the steel companies obtained an injunction. The majority opinion 
of the Court fell in favor of the plaintiffs. Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Vinson argued 
broadly that the extraordinary times called for extraordinary powers. He argued that the 
plaintiffs did not reject the fact that any stoppage of steel production would immediately 
place the Nation in peril. Chief Justice Vinson argued that even though there was an 
absence of express statutory authorization, it was under President Truman’s constitutional 
power to meet a critical situation like this one with immediate action. The alternative 
would have left the President completely powerless, and at the mercy of a slow-moving 
legislature, in a moment when the survival of the United States in foreign matters could 
only be ensured through immediate action. In this case, President Truman was simply 
performing his central duty under the Constitution to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed. 
                                                
67 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 
 Arntson 31 
Chief Justice Vinson’s argument rests on the expansive interpretation of Article 2 
stated earlier. That being said, many of his major assertions rest on the broad belief that, 
apart from statutory or constitutional permission, there are times when the executive is in 
a better position to make informed and timely decisions – especially in times of crisis. 
Zeisberg articulates this idea well. She argues that “while presidents can gain access to 
the knowledge of agencies by consulting them, decision-making according to rules and 
bureaucratic organization is only one model of successful executive branch 
functioning.”68 As she goes on the argue, President Truman was able to make excellent 
judgments using informal consultations with a selected core, rather than through rigid 
adherence to bureaucratic procedure. The fundamental flexibility of the executive branch 
is critical, and a matter of practical necessity, when meeting critical situations.69 
To many, the War Powers Resolution (WPR) was seen as an admittance by 
Congress of the executive’s power to act quickly as well as a re-assertion by the 
legislative branch of its ability to check that power.70 In 1973, Congress attempted to 
reassert its constitutional authority by passing the Resolution over President Nixon’s 
veto. The WPR formally grants the President the ability to put troops into action, yet 
limits executive power as well. Broadly speaking, it gives the executive branch the power 
to act without clear congressional approval under three distinct circumstances. It also 
requires the President to consult with Congress regularly and terminate his use of United 
States Armed Forces within 60 days, unless Congress grants him permission to keep them 
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deployed.71 Proponents of the WPR see it as a renewed sense of congressional 
responsibility and a reiteration of the principles of separation of powers and collective 
decision-making. It supports the idea that constitutional authority in times of crisis or war 
is dynamic. It is truly constructed within the constitutional framework rather than located 
primarily in either the executive or the legislature. In many instances, executive action 
can be justified because had the President not acted, the very Constitution, and by nature 
the very nation itself, would have been compromised. As Alexander Hamilton so neatly 
articulated in Federalist Paper No. 23, too strict an observance of constitutional limits 
could potentially result in constitutional failure.72 The necessity of this executive power 
needs to be controlled by the legislature. The War Powers Resolution is an example of 
the important push and pull between executive and legislative war power. It serves as a 
clear effort to give life to one of the defining features of American constitutional order – 
the principle that power should be both shared and accountable.  
As expected, this interpretation of executive power raises concerns over the 
bloating of presidential war power and the eventual inability of Congress to ever act as a 
co-equal partner in this space. The evolution of war power in response to the quickening 
pace and growing lethality of conflict open the door for overstepping by the executive 
during times of crisis and the justifications of actions through precedent. These concerns 
are valid and should not be disregarded as insubstantial worries. There have times in the 
past when the executive branch uses precedent and a loose interpretation of their war 
powers to make regrettable decisions. One such instance of this is Korematsu v. United 
States. In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was widespread fear that 
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an attack on the West Coast of the United States was imminent. Many politicians argued 
for the internment of local Japanese Americans, citing “the threat of sabotage and 
espionage.”73 As a result, President Roosevelt issued an executive order that gave the 
military the power to “relocate” Japanese Americans to several internment camps located 
in the Western United States. Fred Korematsu resisted the order to move and was arrested 
and convicted. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. In the majority opinion, Justice 
Black supported the executive order, arguing that the Court was unable to conclude that it 
was beyond the war power of the executive to exclude the Japanese from the West Coast 
area. In other words, Black supported President Roosevelt’s actions as extraordinary 
measures taken in the face of “apprehension by the proper military authorities of the 
gravest imminent danger to the public safety.”74 As Justice Frankfurter added, in a 
concurring opinion, “the validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly in 
the context of war. That action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in 
times of peace would be lawless.”75 Similar to the dissenting argument made in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, both Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter 
grounded their arguments in the assertion that the executive was allowed extraordinary 
powers in times of national crisis. At the time, though later determined to be fueled in 
part by racist sentiments, fear of attack had pressed local and national politicians, 
supported by many constituents, to demand quick action by the executive. This 
constituted an active understanding that the President was in a better position to take 
immediate action in response to growing concern. 
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As history shows, it later became known General John L. DeWitt, the general who 
called for the order, knew there was no real legitimate threat. Nonetheless, he had enough 
power in the clout of war to get President Roosevelt to issue the executive order. The 
order resulted in the internment of over 100,000 residents and was later admitted to being 
a decision largely based on race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political 
leadership. Korematsu v. United States is a case that resulted from the use of very 
harmful executive war power. Basic liberties are in danger when a branch uses the 
extraordinary times of war to legitimize otherwise unlawful behavior. There will be, 
throughout history, times when this happens, and when the judiciary’s ruling supports on 
the unconstitutional side of the case. 
Ever since the Founding, the debate over the power of the legislature and 
executive in times of war and crisis has been heated and will continue to be so. As is seen 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer and Korematsu v. United States, the powers 
granted to the executive in particular have only grown in scope and importance, 
sometimes with devastating consequences. While this trend has raised fears in many 
about the burgeoning powers of the President, and what can go wrong when executive 
powers are not checked, these cases also show that he is in a unique power to make quick 
and informed decision when those are most necessary to the survival of the country. The 
question then becomes whether this unique position outweighs the unbalancing of war 
powers between the branches. As Jefferson points out, the executive and legislative 
branches will always be beholden to the People, who have enormous power to keep the 
two branches in check in this regard. 
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Much like other constitutional amendments, the Constitution is broad on the 
subject of war powers. It can be inferred that this was an intentional action by the 
Founders, who wanted to provide only the outlines of what the war powers should look 
like. Though this vagueness has spurred contentious debate on the subject, it has also 
allowed the document to be malleable enough to survive over a century. The President’s 
domination of foreign policy and war power is a natural response to the quickening pace 
of intervention and the advancements of military technology. Increasingly, decisions on 
these topics have needed to be made with very little time – something the legislature 
cannot do because of its fundamental nature. Therefore, we need to embrace the 
vagueness of these powers, and take a fluid approach to understanding Congress’ war 
power, the executive war power, and how to two interact. This needs to occur on the 
foundation of the power’s enumerated by the Constitution and accepted by the People. 
Each branch has a unique and valuable perspective and set of skill it brings. This 
approach to war powers takes advantage of this and moves away from a more rigid 
constitutional interpretation. 
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Chapter IV: Trump’s Military Credibility 
So far, it’s been established that the United States has an abysmal history with 
respect to humanitarian intervention. Working to combat genocide through intervention 
represents an opportunity for the United States to re-embrace its founding values, inject 
pride and confidence into our political institutions, and set an example that other 
powerful nations look to follow. That being said, the analysis is not so simple. Foreign 
policy decisions, especially by powerful countries like the United States, are not made in 
a bubble. There are important geopolitical factors that must be taken into consideration. It 
can be argued that these factors are of even greater importance in humanitarian 
intervention than wars, since the possible gains achieved by the intervening country are 
lower and the risks often higher. Humanitarian intervention presents the opportunity for 
the United States to reclaim its founding values, but at what cost? This chapter will look 
at the effect that humanitarian intervention in genocide has on the United States’ military 
credibility. For the sake of this paper, credibility will be defined as the belief held by 
others that a country will carry out its threats and promises.  
The Military Credibility Trap 
According to the 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength written by the Heritage 
Foundation, the United States risks seeing its interests increasingly challenged and the 
world order it has led since World War II undone.76 The Index argues that the United 
States does not presently have the right force to meet a two-major regional contingency 
requirement (MRC) and that it is not ready to carry out its duties effectively. MRC refers 
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to the ability of the United States to confront and defeat aggression from two adversaries 
at a time. Though these calculated weaknesses may be accurate, military capability is not 
directly related to military credibility. In fact, a country’s military strength in the eyes of 
allies and adversaries can be much different from the realities of that strength on the 
ground. 
Many politicians believe that if the United States backs down from a crisis that it 
has entered, the country’s future credibility will be greatly reduced in the eyes of allies 
and adversaries alike.77 This fear of diminished credibility largely motivated the United 
States’ costly involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars. It has continued to guide 
American policy decisions since the Cold War, as the threat of Communism made it 
imperative for states to not doubt U.S. power or resolve.78  Granted, the United States is 
perceived to be the linchpin of a vast alliance network. Because of this, it must convince 
many other countries that its promises and capabilities are believable.79 Since then, the 
fear of losing credibility has helped propel the United States into conflicts in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya. Regardless of astounding evidence against the theory of 
credibility, both the U.S. military and foreign policy elite are quick to embrace the notion 
that U.S. credibility is both fragile and all-important because it provides another reason 
for large defense budgets and involvement in conflicts around the world. 
Though the above analysis relates largely to U.S. involvement in war, this 
mindset has pervaded Washington’s understanding of humanitarian intervention as well. 
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A series of factors have been identified by scholars as contributing to the reluctance of 
politicians to advocate for intervention. For one, past failed interventions tend to make 
much larger impressions on stakeholders than successful ones. Studies have shown that 
the more successful a humanitarian intervention is, the less likely it is to leave traces on 
people’s political and moral consciousness.80 Disastrous situations tend to leave larger 
and longer lasting impressions on our collective conscience than successful ones. In 
addition, this relationship is often due to a lack of counterfactual scenarios - it is 
impossible to accurately calculate what would have happened had the United States and 
its allies not intervened in a situation. One scholar sees this phenomenon as the moral 
distinction between “doing harm” and “allowing harm”.81 While a failed intervention is 
seen as a case of actively doing harm by making the situation worse, failing to intervene 
is only a case of not preventing harm. Since we are justified in assigning greater moral 
weight to harm than failing to prevent it, we are justified in giving more weight to failed 
interventions than to failed non-interventions.82  
In addition, there seems to be a pervasive and fundamental belief held by 
politicians and power-players that countries who choose to prioritize humanitarian 
intervention in their foreign policy agendas are “weak” or “soft”. American leaders worry 
that other states will question the United States’ resolve and capability if it ever loses 
even a minor scrap in the developing world. As has been argued earlier, humanitarian 
                                                
80 Haydar, 2017. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
 Arntson 39 
intervention is rarely seen as geopolitically advantageous for the United States to 
participate in. Given these two factors, politicians rarely advocate for it.  
Given how widespread this belief is, it is highly concerning that studies using 
historical evidence and declassified documents have shown the theory of “credibility” in 
foreign policy to be largely unsubstantiated. Political scientists have investigated the 
theory repeatedly and have disproven it time and time again. There is no evidence that 
America’s allies or enemies change their behavior based on conclusions about America’s 
credibility, or that such a form of reputation even exists in foreign policy. As one scholar 
argues, “when leaders face the prospect of high-stakes military conflicts, they do not 
assess their adversaries’ credibility by peering into their opponents’ past and evaluating 
their history of keeping or breaking commitments.”83 Research by Ted Hopf, Jonathan 
Mercer, and Daryl Press has proven that states do not judge the credibility of 
commitments in one place by looking at how a country has acted somewhere far away.84 
Historically, when the United States has “lost”, the country’s core strategic relations have 
remained unaffected.85 For example, during the Vietnam War, American officials could 
clearly see that they were losing but for years worried that withdrawing would 
communicate weakness to the Soviet Union. In turn, politicians were scared that this 
would embolden Moscow to test American commitments elsewhere. As it turns out, this 
line of thinking was seriously flawed. Soviet leaders never reached such a conclusion 
and, in fact, were puzzled as to why the U.S. had chosen to sacrifice so many lives for a 
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war that was clearly lost.86 How has the credibility myth become so entrenched in 
Washington? Many scholars point to the fact that the theory is attractive because it paints 
complicated geo-politics in simple and familiar human terms. It encourages politicians 
and scholars to think of states as just like people.87 In addition, America’s broad network 
of alliances plays a key role. It allows allies who also believe the credibility myth to 
entangle themselves in U.S. foreign policy decisions.88 In a nutshell, quantitative tests of 
the intangible concept of credibility, in an environment plagued by problems of strategic 
selection, have not consistently demonstrated that opponents take reputations of resolve 
seriously.89   
What influence has this thinking had on the United States’ foreign policy 
decisions? For one, Washington’s obsession with the threat of weakening credibility has 
forced U.S. foreign policy to become unnecessarily rigid. In every case, a belief in 
“credibility” pulls the United States towards either fighting a war for the wrong reasons 
or staying in a conflict longer than is worthwhile.90 This presents a clear dilemma 
because scholarship shows that one of the most important ways the U.S. can retain its 
global influence is by convincing states that the country is capable of sound judgment, 
not through the thoroughly-debunked theory of military credibility. According to Stephen 
M. Walt, a professor of international relations and Harvard University, U.S. commitments 
are most credible when the American interest in an area is obvious to all, mostly because 
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states attempt to figure out how the United States is going to act in an area by attempting 
to discern whether it is in the country’s best interest to do so.91 If U.S. allies believe that 
the United States is skillful at weighing situations soberly and rationally, then they can 
collaborate their actions and will be more inclined to follow the U.S.’ lead. 
Intervention in Genocide as a Source of Military Credibility 
As argued earlier, Washington’s obsession with the credibility myth has led the 
United States to either involve itself in frivolous conflicts abroad or stay in failed wars 
long past the appropriate time. Not only has this led to the exhaustion of military 
resources and loss of life, but it has also had devastating consequences for the U.S.’ 
perceived brand of foreign policy. Donald Trump’s presidency, including his perceived 
lack of competence both generally and with regards to foreign policy, has only intensified 
the U.S.’ suffering global reputation. In foreign policy, competence depends on a 
sufficient knowledge regarding the state of the world and the key forces that drive world 
politics. This knowledge is what drives well-informed and intelligent policy decisions.92 
It also means having organizational skills, discipline, and a level of judgment that allows 
for these different elements to combine in the pursuit of well-chosen goals. It is widely 
believed that President Trump lacks these skills. Scholars arguing this point to his blatant 
nepotism, vast conflicts of interest, overt misogyny, and repeated fabrication of facts.93 
This incompetence has already made itself apparent.94 For example, President Trump’s 
decision to drop the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was seen by many scholars and 
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politicians as an enormous policy mistake. Not only has it undermined the United States’ 
position in Asia, but it has also opened the door for larger Chinese influence, effectively 
hurting the U.S.’ economy. In fact, Trump recently asked trade officials to explore the 
possibility of the United States rejoining the TPP agreement. A similar narrative can be 
made for his decision to pull out of the Paris climate accord.95 Apart from the political, 
economic, and social consequences of these actions, a weakening of the United States’ 
global reputation has also led U.S. allies to question the country’s advice, guidance, and 
requests.96 It can be argued that states that lose confidence in America’s confidence will 
begin to hedge and make their own arrangements. They’ll do deals with each other and 
might even begin to regard the United States as an adversary. 
Scholarship shows that one of the most important ways the U.S. can retain and 
strengthen its global influence is by convincing states that the country is capable of sound 
judgment. The “credibility” myth, coupled with President Trump’s brand of foreign 
policy, has weakened the country’s reputation to devastating ends. Looking forward, it is 
imperative that the U.S. government look at ways it can increase its reputation in the eyes 
of its allies and adversaries. This section will argue that humanitarian intervention in 
genocide, under certain circumstances, presents a clear way for the United States to 
increase its reputation for good judgment in the eyes of the international community. In 
order to minimize the perceived invasion of another state’s credibility, a possible problem 
acknowledged and addressed earlier, the United States should only intervene in genocide 
under certain circumstances, as outlined in the scholarly article The State and Human 
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Rights: Sovereignty versus Humanitarian Intervention by Simon Duke. Humanitarian 
intervention should only be sanctioned under the following conditions:97 
1. there is a provable and grave violation of fundamental human rights 
2. such violations are extensive and pose the threat of widespread loss of life 
3. all other recourse beneath the level of intervention has been exhausted 
4. any use of force should be proportional, whereby it protects those 
endangered but aims to cause minimum disruption or disturbance to other 
factors aside from human rights 
5. intervention should, where possible, involve some form of consent from 
the host state 
Creating and using a strong the framework above will help prevent the United States 
from entangling itself in a humanitarian situation that either does not warrant 
international invasion or ends up further crumbling the country’s reputation for decision 
making and sound reasoning. Equally as important, it will help quell worries by 
politicians and scholars that humanitarian intervention in genocide is an unnecessary risk 
leading to little or no reward for the United States. This is because the framework above 
helps to ensure that the U.S. enters humanitarian conflicts only when the need is clear, the 
mission is feasible, and U.S. leaders are confident that intervention will not make matters 
worse.98 In doing so, the United States can begin to rebuild its reputation as a rational 
actor. This rebuilding will hopefully lead to a strengthening of ally relationships and a 
stronger foreign policy overall. Sticking to this framework, and intervening in genocide 
when all of the conditions are met, will help ensure that humanitarian intervention 
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becomes an opportunity for the United States to increase its reputation in the eyes of its 
allies. 
 Genocide will always constitute a provable and grave violation of fundamental 
human rights. This is an important characteristic, because being able to show doubtless 
violations of this nature means that a legal basis for corrective measures can be 
established. Even when access is denied by a state, advancements in surveillance 
technology have made it increasingly difficult for perpetrators of genocide to stem the 
flow of information regarding violations of human rights.99 Genocide also meets the 
second requirement - that the human rights abuses be extensive and pose the threat of 
widespread loss of life. “Extensive” refers to the ability of an official observer to 
establish a pattern of abuse and establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that lives are in 
danger.100 
 One of the most important dimensions of the framework is that humanitarian 
intervention employing the use of force should not be undertaken until all other forms of 
persuasion aimed at saving lives have been attempted. These may include direct appeals 
by the U.S. government, ad hoc bodies, regional organizations, specialized non-
governmental organizations, private institutions, and the United Nations itself.101 It is 
important to note that oftentimes, actions short of armed humanitarian intervention may 
exacerbate human rights abuses. For example, the use of economic blockades often harms 
those already subject to humanitarian abuse. The United States should make efforts to 
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coordinate its efforts in this phase with these other institutions. Not only will this make 
those effort more effective, but it will also present the U.S. with the chance to strengthen 
its relationship with these powerful allies and strengthen its reputation by proving its 
foreign policy prowess. If the United States can get the backing, support, and resources of 
international institutions and countries, this will significantly strengthen its offensive 
strategy. 
 Part four of the framework ensures that the United States does not monopolize the 
political or social weakening of the country it invades. It narrows the scope of U.S. 
influence and acknowledges that it is not the job of the interventionist to do anything 
more than enforce the stipulations of international treaties pertaining to human rights. 
The United States should avoid efforts to largely influence or change the political, 
religious, or cultural values of the country in question. Humanitarian intervention in 
genocide is a response to the immediate needs of victims of violence and not an answer to 
the longer-term stability of a regime or country.102 Along this same vein, the United 
States should look to limit the time it is directly intervening in a conflict. Finally, the 
United States should try and establish some degree of consent from the host state. Similar 
to the other stipulations explained above, this will help guarantee that the state maintains 
as much sovereignty as possible. Otherwise, the United States risks charges of 
unwarranted meddling in the internal affairs of another state by both people in the U.S. 
government and abroad. 
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 Humanitarian intervention in genocide has many practical difficulties and has 
proven to be a destructive tool for international peace and stability if used incorrectly. 
That being said, it can also be an extremely powerful tool. Following the framework 
outlined above will help prevent the United States from entangling itself in a 
humanitarian situation that further tarnishes the United States foreign policy brand in the 
eyes of Americans and international actors. It also serves as an opportunity for the U.S. to 
strengthen relationships with allies and international institutions. Following a strong 
framework, developing actionable steps, and making sound policy decisions will help the 
country create a very sound brand of foreign policy and strengthen the United States’ 
domestic and international reputation.  
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Chapter V: A Case Study – The Darfur Genocide 
 This chapter will attempt to cement the theories and framework discussed above 
to a real-world case study. The current genocide occurring in Darfur, Sudan will be 
critically analyzed. To begin, a synthesized background of the conflict will be presented. 
Though the application of the framework established in Chapter IV, this paper will 
attempt to determine whether it is geopolitically strategic and advantageous for the 
United States to intervene in the conflict.  
Background 
 Darfur is a region in Western Sudan, It is considered the largest country in Africa 
and encompasses an area roughly the size of Texas.103 Darfur had a pre-conflict 
population of about six million people. Civil war has existed between the northern and 
southern regions of Sudan for over ten years.104 Following independence from Britain in 
1965, Sudan became involved in two prolonged civil wars for most of the 20th century. 
These conflicts were rooted in northern economic, political, and social domination of 
largely non-Muslim and non-Arab southern Sudanese;105 While the northern region is 
predominantly made up of Muslims who are ethnically Arab, the South is largely 
inhabited by groups of Christians. Competition for scarce resource has plated a serious 
role in furthering the conflict. Adding to the complexities of the violence are 
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desertification, famines, and the discovery of oil that has made the Sudanese government 
and international contributors increasingly interested in the land.106  
 Though the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the civil war in 2005, the 
country remained largely underdeveloped and marginalized at the federal level, lacking 
both infrastructure and substantive development assistant. These factors have made the 
environment ripe with opportunity for conflict between Muslims in the north and 
Christians in the south. Killings largely began in the Spring of 2003, after two Darfuri 
rebel groups launched a rebellion against the Sudanese government by attacking an air 
force base in Al-Fashir.107 They demanded an end to the oppression of Darfur’s non-Arab 
population and economic marginalization. In response, the Sudanese government enlisted 
a group of government-armed and funded Arab militias known as the Janjaweed (“devils 
on horseback”) to resolve the conflict.108 These militias have killed at least 70,000 
villagers – with estimated deaths ranging above 300,000 – have raped thousands more, 
and have driven roughly two and a half million into refugee camps, many in the 
neighboring country of Chad.109 
 Despite a ceasefire agreement signed by a number of groups involved in the 
conflict, including the Sudanese government and various rebel groups, violence 
continued in Darfur. In the Summer of 2004, dozens of political groups and bodies, 
including the U.S. Congress and the EU Parliament, recognized western Sudan as a site 
of genocide. Colin Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State, became the first member of the 
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U.S. executive branch to declare the conflict in Darfur “a genocide.” He openly told the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that a genocide had been carried out in Darfur, 
that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed were responsible, and that the genocide 
may still be ongoing.110 Then-President George W. Bush called for the number of 
international troops in Darfur to be doubled. In addition, then Presidential candidate 
Barak Obama campaigned on the issue in 2008, referring to the Darfur genocide as a 
“stain of our souls”.111 This declaration by the U.S. government was almost unavoidable, 
given the annihilating character of attacks on non-Arab civilians and villages in Darfur. 
In a directive written in August of 2004, Musa Hilal, one of the most infamous Janjaweed 
leaders, plainly spelled out the ambitions of the group. Among other things, he pointed to 
the desire to change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes.112 Though 
cease-fires were signed by the Sudanese government, it had no intention of honoring the 
documents and simply signed them as a way to gain an effective diplomatic cover under 
which the work of ethnic cleansing could continue.113 This, coupled with the United 
States vague declarations of action, meant that the genocide was largely allowed to 
continue unabated. 
 The expression “never again” is always used whenever U.S. politicians talk about 
human rights atrocities such as genocide. Any discussion of the Holocaust, Yugoslavia, 
Cambodia, or Rwanda elicits a plea that such violence and hatred should never happen 
again. Despite an abundance of information about the atrocities occurring in Sudan, what 
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ensued was a systematic denial of humanitarian aid to the ethnic populations most 
affected. There have been some steps in the right direction. For example Omar al-Bashir, 
the President of Sudan, was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2010 
for the crime of genocide. This constituted the first instance of the ICC issuing a warrant 
for genocide to a sitting head of state.114 That being said, the international community at 
large took the same stance with regards to Darfur as it did with the Rwandan genocide – 
that of an outside observer and bystander. According to author and scholar Rebecca Joyce 
Frey, Bashir and other leaders realized that the lack of intervention in Rwanda from the 
international community largely gave them free rein to continue the genocide without 
having any serious concerns over international intervention.115 
Past and Future U.S. Involvement 
 A brief look into the history of the genocide in Darfur shows a systematic choice 
by countries to avoid any sort of substantive military intervention in the area. Though 
there have been attempts by the African Union and United Nations to station troops in the 
area, their ranks have never grown beyond 9,000 and they have made little progress in 
stopping the destruction, let alone in reversing it by allowing millions of displaced 
Darfuris to begin returning to their homeland.116 Though Powell warned that the United 
States might take the issue to the UN Security Council if the Sundanese government 
continued to wreak havoc, those threats amounted to a simple threat that sanctions might 
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be imposed.117 Despite a significant decrease in armed conflict in South Sudan, civilians 
in Darfur are still being constantly exposed to violence and criminality.118 According to 
Human Rights Watch, Sudan’s human rights record remains abysmal, with continued 
attacks on civilians by government forces and widespread arbitrary detentions of activists 
and protesters.119 A long-term comprehensive solution to address the needs of the 
region’s people remains elusive. Despite efforts on the park of by UNAMID and the 
African Union High-Level Implementation Pavel, little tangible progress has been made 
in the Darfur peace process.120 A recent Security Council briefing revealed that the 
situation in Darfur has not yet been normalized; Security issues, unlawful killings, and 
human rights violations make the conditions volatile.121 There have been continued 
reports of sexual violence and concerns that the government’s ongoing disarmament 
campaign is leading to increased tension in armed confrontations that threaten to 
undermine recent improvements in the security of the region.122 
 Using the framework established and explained earlier in this paper, it is now 
important to establish whether the United States should gather the military power and 
resources necessary for a more substantive and genuine military intervention in Darfur at 
this time. What makes the lack of direct U.S. involvement incredibly perplexing is that 
U.S. officials have actually used the word “genocide” when describing the atrocities 
occurring in Sudan. Unlike other genocides in the past, the one of Darfur has attracted an 
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avalanche of material – memoirs, journalistic accounts, and histories just to name a few. 
No genocide has ever been so thoroughly documented while it was taking place.123 As 
Richard Just writes, “we document what we do not stop. The truth does not set anybody 
free.”124 On the bright side, this documentation helps fulfil the first two parts of the 
framework. It provides evidence towards a provable and grave violation of fundamental 
human rights and the guarantee that the violations are both extensive and pose a threat of 
widespread loss of life. The UN estimates that between 200,000 and 300,000 people have 
died in Darfur since the start of the current conflict in 2004. Out of the 7.4 million total 
people living in the region, an estimated 6.4 million people are currently directly affected 
by the conflict.125 These deaths have been well-documented. Many people were placed in 
the area as unarmed “observers”. In his novel The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing 
Witness to the Genocide in Darfur, Brian Steidle talks about his time documenting the 
tragedy.126 His job was to monitor violations of a given cease-fire. After a village had 
been attacked, Steidle and his team would investigate, interviewing victims and 
photographing the destruction. With the information they gathered, they would write 
reports, which were sent to the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia.127 This 
abundance of documentation shows that violations of human rights by the government-
funded militias are abundant and widespread. Over the course of just one massacre in the 
village of Hamada, 107 villagers were brutally tortured and murdered.128 Bodies were 
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strewn along blood-soaked village paths. There are reports that infants had been crushed 
– their faces smashed with rifle butts and their bodies tossed into the dirt. These accounts 
confirm in full that the first two parts of the framework are wholeheartedly fulfilled. 
 To fulfil the third part of the framework, it is important to assess whether all other 
recourse beneath the level of intervention has been exhausted. In terms of U.S. 
involvement, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama took stands on the conflict 
in various ways, yet meaningful action towards improving the situation was never taken. 
As mentioned earlier, the Bush administration went as far as to declare what was 
happening in the region a “genocide”. This was a large step in the right direction, 
considering how in earlier conflicts the term had been avoided by politicians in an 
attempt to minimize public insistence on intervention. In addition, President Bush’s 
administration was instrumental in bringing about the December 31st “permanent cease-
fire”. It also pressed, in vain, for international sanctions to force Sudan to stop the killing 
in Darfur.129 As mentioned earlier, though cease-fire agreements were signed by 
members of the Sudanese government, they were largely ineffective at curbing the 
violence. Though the ICC was eventually able to denounce Sudanese leaders for crimes 
against humanity due to their role in the genocide, the United States was a large inhibitor 
of this progress. The administration worked to block a proposal to authorize the ICC to 
investigate war crimes, pushing instead for an ad hoc regional court.130 This was 
dismissed by many as doomed to delay and ineffectiveness. Many saw the ICC as the 
best hope for pressing the fear of prosecution into Sudanese leaders. 
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 President Obama inherited the responsibility for integrating Darfur into U.S. 
policy. During his campaign, he had expressed the importance of ending the genocide.131 
In 2006, he made a promise to the people of Darfur: “We can’t say ‘never again’ and 
allow it to happen again. As President of the United States, I don’t intend to abandon 
people or turn a blind eye to slaughter.”132 Unilateral economic sanctions continued under 
his administration, among other non-interventionist policies.133 In a sad turn of events, 
the outgoing president issued an executive order lifting most of its sanctions against the 
government of Sudan.134 Why the change in policy? The executive order stated that 
lifting the sanctions was in response to Sudan’s new cooperation on counter-terrorism, 
helpful moves towards ending the civil war in South Sudan, and supposed progress 
towards reaching a political settlement with various armed and unarmed domestic 
opponents.135 That being said, it largely disregarded the continued human rights abuses 
that were occurring by the Sudanese government into its own people. As Ahmed Koduda, 
a commentator on East African affairs, argued at the time, “Domestically, nothing has 
really changed… The Americans really want to get this done one way or another and 
wanted to make it palatable to the advocacy community… the regime has not done 
anything domestically to warrant this change.”136 These moves came as an attempt to 
normalize relations with the country. While this strategy isn’t new, prior attempts at 
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normalization had always been accompanied by clear conditions regarding the ending of 
human rights violations. This was not the case here.  
 This brief history shows that up until this point, entirely non-militaristic avenues 
have been pursued in attempts to curb the human rights abuses occurring in Darfur. These 
have included various cease-fire agreements and economic sanctions among other things. 
While troops have been deployed to the region, they have been on the behalf of the 
African Union and United Nations; Though conflict and abuses continue in Darfur, 
including government attacks on entire villages, the United States has not deployed an 
impactful number of troops.137 This history seems to show that not only have all other 
forms of recourse been attempted without success, the United States had the manpower 
and influence to make a significant difference in the area through armed intervention.  
 The fourth part of the framework aims to ensure that the United States does not 
use the political or social weakening of the country it invades to its own advantage. If the 
U.S. is to intervene in Darfur, the intervention should occur according to a specific 
timeline. The issue that resides with fulfilling this part of the framework, and ensuring 
that military intervention is justified, is the fact that it requires that the military 
intervention in question only respond to the immediate needs of the victims. Military 
intervention in genocide should not address the long-term stability of the country. 
Because the conflict has been occurring since 2004, there have already been attempts at 
addressing the Sudanese people’s immediate needs through humanitarian aid. Any 
military attempts by the U.S. government would most likely be aimed at reforming the 
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current government, as they’re the major perpetrators in the conflict. This would 
inevitably lead to a power vacuum that the United States would look to fill through 
democratic and free elections. Though military intervention by the U.S. would likely help 
stem human rights abuses, it would surely influence the political, social, and economic 
values in Sudan. The United States would be exposing itself to backlash from the 
international community and would likely be seen as an unwarranted meddler. The 
timeline of the conflict also very likely inhibits the U.S. from receiving any sort of 
consent from the Sudanese government. In other words, stipulations 4 and 5 are unlikely 
to be fulfilled if the United States intervenes in Darfur. As mentioned above, 
humanitarian intervention in genocide has many practical difficulties and can be an 
incredible destructive tool for both the intervener and the state being intervened in. These 
facts show that though something must be done about the human rights abuses occurring 
in the area, military intervention by the United States might not be the most domestically 
advantageous action to take at this time. In other words, there might be more diplomatic 
options that can be pursued to similar effects, without exposing the United States to 
increased attacks on its abilities to conduct sound foreign policy. Though this sobering 
fact does not completely eliminate U.S. military intervention in the area, it signals that 
the United States should look towards other avenues. Perhaps by pursuing meaningful 
diplomatic options, the U.S. can still succeed in strengthening relationships with its allies 
and stemming human rights abuses. In addition, non-militaristic options can still portray 
to the international community that the U.S. is capable of making sound foreign policy 
decisions, thereby increasing its international reputation. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 This paper has provided a detailed analysis of the interplay between U.S. 
intervention in genocide, the country’s founding values, and our understanding of 
reputational credibility in the military sphere. Though an analysis of international 
relations theories, constitutional law precedents, and relevant case studies, this paper 
argues the following thesis: Humanitarian intervention in genocide, under certain 
conditions and with certain stipulations, serves as a feasible way for the United States to 
both reclaim its founding values and increase its international reputation. Politicians and 
scholars should start seeing humanitarian intervention as a politically strategic avenue for 
the United States to pursue.  
 In addition to a discussion on general theory, a framework was created. The 
application if this framework to specific genocides helps the reader to critically evaluate 
whether U.S. involvement is justified. As seen in its application to the genocide occurring 
in Darfur, this framework helps ensure that the United States does not intervene militarily 
in a conflict that ends up further crumbling its international reputational credibility.  
 Though this paper mainly addresses the theoretical relationship between U.S. 
humanitarian intervention, the values of the Framers, and the idea of reputational 
credibility as a part of foreign policy, there is much room for expansion into others 
topics. These include the morality of military intervention in humanitarian crises and the 
effects of powerful intermediaries on international crisis such as genocide. Though the 
scope of this paper does not allow the time to dive into these other aspects, they provide 
exciting areas for future research on the topic. 
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